JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. The Cumberland Lodge Conference of May 1979 was clearly a milestone in the historiography of the "Third Reich."' As we know, the theme of the conference, "The National Socialist Regime and German Society," provided a platform for sharp disagreement about the place of Hitler in the decision-making processes of the Nazi regime -disagreement which Tim Mason memorably described as between "functionalists" and "intentionalists" examining the Nazi state, thus defining the terms of a debate which occupied a central place in textbooks for years thereafter. The question of whether one should regard the actions of the "National Socialist Regime" as the unfolding of the ideology and expressed intentions of its leadership (and of Hitler in particular), or whether one instead should focus on the dynamics of decision-making processes and the institutional pressures inherent in the Nazi system of government, seemed to dominate discussion of the Nazi state during the 1980s.
regime functioned, how the Nazi policies of genocide were carried out, how the "Third Reich" administered and exploited wartime occupied Europe, particularly the killing fields of Eastern Europe, how racialism permeated almost all aspects of Nazi politics and the functioning of the Nazi state, how the Nazi wars of annihilation were fought, and about both the degree to which local initiatives were instrumental in shaping the campaigns of mass murder on the ground and the responsibility of Adolf Hitler for the decisions which led to war and genocide. The result is a much better informed, much more detailed and more nuanced picture of the Nazi regime, and most serious historians of the Nazi regime now are to some extent both "intentionalists" and "functionalists" -insofar as those terms still can be used at all.
Thus it might appear that the controversy which erupted at the Cumberland Lodge conference was less earthshaking than assumed at the time and shortly afterwards. Interest in the "intentionalist" versus "functionalist" debate now seems to lie, if it lies anywhere, in that graveyard of historiographical concerns, the English A-level syllabus. One almost might believe that peace had broken out among historians of Nazi Germany -something which on past performance would seem highly implausible, and which is belied by the renewed and often bitter controversies of more recent years. These more recent controversies, I want to suggest, are not unrelated to the fundamental issues raised at Cumberland Lodge.
The shift in the assessment of "functionalism" and "intentionalism" and its removal from the front line of historiographical controversy have been due to a number of interrelated developments which unfolded since we gathered in Cumberland Lodge in 1979. One such is the opening up of new archival sources, particularly in eastern Europe in the wake of the collapse of the former Soviet bloc, which among other things has allowed us to see how decisions were carried out which led to the deaths of millions of people in Galicia, Ukraine, Lithuania, White Russia. Another is the demise of Marxism as a dominant historical paradigm. The appeal of structural explanations revolving around the relationship between capitalism and fascism and of class and class conflict has faded, not least because they appeared inadequate before the principal challenge facing any serious historian of the Third Reich, namely how to explain the greatest crimes committed by human beings in modern history.
In recent years the focus of the writing on Nazi Germany has shifted precisely to these crimes. We now work in an intellectual environment very different from that in which it could be asserted that: "For some time, for many decades, the materialist conception of history-the first-born intellectual child of Marx and Engels -has been growing in self-confidence. This moral charge, it seems to me, lay at the core of the disputes which were aired at Cumberland Lodge, and points to the issue which is a matter of controversy no less sharp today than it was a quarter of a century ago. It has resurfaced in some form or other in every major dispute among historians of Nazi Germany for the past twenty years, and is as pressing today as it was in 1976, when Bracher first published the accusation quoted above. It was present in the "Historikerstreit" of the mid-1980s, when it was a weapon used most effectively by figures on the left against the concern expressed by Ernst Nolte about a "past that would not pass away Perhaps because we became fixated on the terms "functionalist" and "intentionalists," we tended somewhat to lose sight of the fundamental accusation of "trivialization" and dereliction of the moral duty of the historian which lay behind the Cumberland Lodge dispute. It was perhaps too easy to assume that at stake was just how to assess the decision-making process in Nazi Germany, and that the entrenched positions were relatively easily correlated to political positionsthe "intentionalists" regarded as tending towards the conservative right and the "functionalists" identified more with the left. Thus perhaps we lost sight of what the debate was really about, and continues to be about: morality, and the moral obligations of historians. In this regard things may not have changed all that much in the past quarter of a century. Much of the recent work on Nazi Germany, some of it quite impressive, is also about morality.
As already noted, this is most strikingly the case in the "New History Explanation, in the sense used here, included the use of (Marxist) theoretical perspectives which were widely employed twenty-odd years ago but which have rather fallen out of fashion since. Nevertheless, Mason's critique is not at all irrelevant to today's concerns, and it does not require a tremendous amount of imagination to see how this critique might be directed at Burleigh's "New History" of the Third Reich. That book is, in Burleigh's own words, about "what happened when sections of the German elites and masses of ordinary people chose to abdicate their individual critical facilities in favor of politics based on faith,hope,hatred and sentimental collective self-regard for their own race and nation."10 It is a story of (abdicated) moral responsibility, of a successful "assault on decency" and the "moral breakdown and transformation of an advanced industrial society." Burleigh dismisses the old debates about the alleged "modernization" brought about by Nazism or about the relative importance of intentions and structures in determining Nazi policies with a disdainful air. His approach is the antithesis of that posited by Richard Breitman, who a few years ago in a general essay on the "final solution" asserted (perhaps more in hope than as an observation): "Historians prefer to avoid moral or theological judgments and to find useful analytical concepts."11 Instead, Burleigh's work suggests that the ultimate responsibility of the historian is precisely to take a moral stance, as a warning to the reader. His story is about criminality and morality; his approach is, indeed, "to investigate, to classify and to order, to hate, to love and to warn." When examining the recent historiography of the Third Reich, it is revealing to note the almost complete divergence between the subjects discussed in detail at Cumberland Lodge (as opposed to the general, overarching debates about "Hitler in the National Socialist Power Structure") and the subjects to which Burleigh devotes close attention in his "New History." The more detailed papers given at Cumberland Lodge concerned various government and Party institutions (the civil service, local and regional government, the Reichsndhrstand, the SA, etc.), questions of Nazi economic policy, and interest-group politics. These themes lent themselves more to a "functionalist" analysis at the Cumberland Lodge conference, and do not really figure in Burleigh's history. Conversely, the politics of reproduction and eugenics,Nazi policy against the Jews, the all-pervasive, applied racism of the regime, the barbarous conduct of the war, the apocalyptic vision of the Nazisthese are themes which lie at the center of Burleigh's synthesis (and much other recent research) but were conspicuous by their absence at Cumberland Lodge in 1979. The fact that such themes were not discussed at Cumberland Lodge, and that heated debates about the nature of the Nazi regime could have taken place without much if any reference to them, shows the distance we have traveled in the past couple of decades. Now the monstrous crimes of the Nazi regime are explicitly at the center of our concerns. However, despite this important shift in emphasis, the underlying point at issue has remained the same: the moral stance of the historian and the need to explain. In this sense, the debates of Cumberland Lodge are no less relevant to present-day approaches to the history of Nazi Germany than they were to the concerns and preoccupations which so agitated us twenty years ago.
